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Health spending, illicit financial flows and tax incentives 
in Malawi
   Abstract
This analysis examines the gaps in health care financing in Malawi and 
how foregone taxes could fill these gaps. It begins with an assessment of  
the disease burden and government health expenditure. Then it analyses 
the tax revenues foregone by the government of  Malawi by two main 
routes
• Illicit financial flows (IFF) from the country
• Tax incentives.
We find that there are significant financing gaps in the health sector; for 
example, government expenditure is United States Dollars (USD) 177 
million for 2013/2014 while projected donor contribution in 2013/2014 
is USD 207 million and the total cost for the minimal health package is 
USD 535 million. Thus the funding gap between the government budget 
for health and the required spending to provide the minimal package 
for 2013/2014 is USD 358 million. On the other hand we estimate that 
almost USD 400million is lost through IFF and corporate utilization of  
tax incentives each year.
The revenues foregone plus the current government health spending 
would be sufficient to cover the minimal public health package for all 
Malawians and would help tackle Malawi’s disease burden. Every effort 
must be made, including improving transparency and revising laws, to 
curtail IFF and moderate tax incentives.
Introduction
Malawians suffer a markedly high disease burden and levels 
of  mortality. This is largely due to poverty, inadequate 
financing of  health care services and a weak health system. 
Malawi is one of  the poorest countries in the world with 62 
per cent of  its 15.9 million population living on USD1.25 
a day or less1. It is the poor who are disproportionately 
affected by the disease burden and mortality2. Further, the 
health sector is poorly financed owing to low domestic 
resource mobilization3. Increasing the domestic resources 
available to promote health (and development in general) 
remains a critical policy focus for low income countries in 
Africa such as Malawi.
The disease burden, health system and health 
spending in Malawi
The disease burden
Common to other sub-Saharan African countries, Malawi’s 
population suffers from a significant disease burden, 
made up of  illness, impairment and mortality to which 
diseases including tuberculosis, malaria and HIV contribute 
substantially. The HIV prevalence is among the highest in the 
world: around one in ten people aged 15-49 – around a million 
people – live with HIV/AIDS, 60 per cent of  whom are 
women. HIV/AIDS was identified as the leading contributor 
to disease burden. While the rollout of  antiretroviral therapy 
has transformed the public health landscape in the last few 
years the health consequences of  widespread HIV infection 
for the population remain substantial. One third of  children, 
and two-thirds of  adults, who need antiretroviral treatment 
for HIV are receiving it4,5 and a huge and continuing effort 
to extend this and other interventions are needed. In 2008, 
the leading causes of  disease among children under-five were 
lower respiratory infections, diarrhoea and malaria6. By 2010 
around half  of  all under-fives were stunted (low height for 
age) and just over 1 in 10 were underweight (low weight for 
age, < -2SD)7; serial nutritional surveys indicate little change 
in rates of  child malnutrition over several decades. Alongside 
these problems there is evidence of  a growing burden of  
non-communicable diseases, with 33 per cent of  adults 
having hypertension8. According to the World Bank, around 
8,000 Malawians die every year from diarrhoea, almost all 
of  which is due to poor water, sanitation and hygiene9. The 
maternal mortality rate is among the highest in Africa, with 
estimates around 460 per 100,000 live births, remaining 
largely unchanged over recent years. By contrast the under-
five mortality rate has steadily fallen from 180/1,000 births 
in 1999 to 133 in 2004 and to 83 in 2012 ; yet absolute child 
mortality rates remain high: more than one in nine Malawian 
children die before reaching their fifth birthday. According 
to the WHO, the most common causes of  deaths among 
children under five are pneumonia, HIV/AIDS and malaria 
– which each account for 13-14 per cent of  deaths10.
The health system The government of  Malawi identifies 
public health as a key priority area in its flagship development 
plan – the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 2011-
1611. Since 2002, the government has been promoting an 
Essential Health Package (EHP)12. This is delivered at the 
community, primary and secondary levels, is free of  charge 
and is designed to address the most common causes of  
morbidity and mortality, focusing mainly on HIV, TB and 
maternal and neonatal conditions13. The health system 
in Malawi is challenged at all levels as noted by the WHO 
country office: “The health system in Malawi continues to 
experience challenges in human resource shortage, weak 
health information systems and shrinking funding for district 
health service delivery”4. There are two doctors and 38 nurses 
per 100,000 population14, but these cadres are supported by 
22/100,000 non physician clinicians15. However the human 
resources are insufficient to meet basic health care needs. A 
recent analysis notes that key constraints to the successful 
implementation of  the EHP in Malawi include a widespread 
shortage of  staff. For example only half  of  expected person-
days of  clinical staff  were available, with unfilled posts 
and workshops accounting for the days missed. Despite 
the frequent absences due to training, healthcare workers 
remain poorly trained with only 50% knowing that it is 
important to count the respiratory rate in children with a 
lower respiratory tract infection12. Supervision is inadequate 
and job satisfaction is very low because of  low salaries and 
poor working conditions12. However, in order to improve 
staff  retention a top up of  52% of  gross pay, amounting 
to 25-41% after tax was introduced in 2005. This resulted 
in an increase in students applying for training in the health 
sector but the impact on retention has not been assessed16. 
However, this experience does demonstrate that an injection 
of  revenue can increase the number of  students interested in 
training to be a health care worker. Health system weakness 
is also a major constraint, for example in commodity supply, 
only one quarter of  health centres having a supply of  basic 
antibiotics12.
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Health spending
The government’s annual budget allocation to health is 
given in Table 1. Malawi’s budget is aligned to its second 
Malawian Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS 
II)17 Around 70% of  the total budget is allocated to the 
priorities of  the MGDS II and 12% of  the total budget 
is allocated to public health, sanitation, malaria and HIV 
management. The allocations and projected allocations 
in USD are shown in Table 1 for the years 2011 to 2016. 
Donors contribute significantly to health financing 
in Malawi; however the estimated transaction costs 
range from 32% of  the total (USAID) to 8% (DFID) 
and unpredictability complicates planning. It has been 
estimated by the Government of  Malawi that on average 
19% of  pledged donor funds do not reach the health 
sector but are consumed by overheads and transaction 
costs11. Eighty per cent of  the Ministry’s budget is 
allocated to salaries and other recurrent costs, with 16 
per cent allocated to medical supplies and expenses18.
Table 1 Budget allocation to public health in US$
* Exchange rate from the Reserve Bank of  Malawi. On 
31/12/13 rate was MK435.23 = 1 USD, on 31/12/12 
rate was MK335.13, on 31/12/11 rate was MK163.75
One way to assess the adequacy of  health spending is to 
utilize a measure of  per capita expenditure. The WHO 
Commission on Health and Macroeconomics have 
estimated the cost for the provision of  minimal services 
to be US$34 per capita in 2007 and US$38 per capita 
in 2015. The estimated resources required to achieve 
the goals set out in the EHP in Malawi in 2011 were 
US$33.4 per capita11. The capital required to provide 
the EHP for each person in Malawi has been estimated 
using the population for that year and is shown in Table 
119. The WHO notes that Malawi’s per capita health 
spending has always been low and not enough to cover 
the Essential Health Package (EHP)4. Using the figures 
above, Malawi’s public health spending of  USD167 
million plus donor expenditure in 2012/13 amounted 
to per capita expenditure of  USD28.20 These per capita 
spending figures do not capture private spending on 
health; the World Bank estimates that in 2011, per capita 
total expenditure on health in the country was USD 7720.
Tax, IFF and tax incentives in low income 
countries
Tax and development
Taxes are the most important, sustainable and predictable 
source of  finance for governments in low income 
countries. They provide revenues for the provision 
of  essential social services including health, sanitation and 
education. The United Nations estimates that if  the world’s 
Least Developed Countries raised at least 20 per cent of  
their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from taxes, they 
could achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)21. 
However, Malawi raises around 20 per cent of  its GDP in 
taxes22, but is “off  track” to reach most of  the MDG except 
for reduction in under-five mortality23. Malawi’s revenues 
from taxes are derived mostly form Valued Added Tax (VAT) 
and Pay as You Earn (PAYE), see Table 2.
Table 2: Malawi tax revenues, 2011/12 [18]
Countries can raise significant amounts of  money from 
businesses and individuals if  they collect the taxes due. 
However, substantial tax revenues are lost through two 
mechanisms which are illicit financial flows (IFF) and tax 
incentives.
Illicit financial flows
Illicit financial flows are funds that are illegally transferred, 
illegally earned, or illegally utilized and cover all unrecorded 
private financial outflows that drive the accumulation of  
foreign assets by residents in contravention of  applicable 
laws24. They involve the transfer of  money earned through tax 
evasion, corruption and other criminal activities25. As these 
flows are illicit and therefore difficult to quantify, researchers 
have had to use proxy measures to estimate them26. Global 
Financial Integrity, a research and advocacy organization 
estimates that between 1970 – 2008, illicit financial flows 
from Africa amounted to a USD 854 billion27. There is little 
doubt that loss of  capital from poor countries negatively 
impacts their development and should be curtailed25. Boyce 
and Ndikumana estimate that US$814 billion flowed from 
SSA between 1970 to 201028. Table 3 provides estimates of  
illicit financial flows from Malawi, using data from Global 
Financial Integrity. Overall, the equivalent of  USD 4.7 
billion has left Malawi in the ten years 2001-10, representing 
an average of  USD 469 million per year.
Table 3: Illicit financial flows from Malawi, 2001-10 (USD million)
[24]
These illicit financial flows translate into substantial lost tax 
revenues for the Malawian people since illicit flows are, by 
definition, untaxed. Corporate income tax is 30 per cent for 
Malawian companies and 35 per cent for branches of  foreign 
companies in Malawi, so a middle figure of  32.5 per cent 
is reasonable to assess lost tax revenues. Using this figure, 
illicit financial flows 8 have resulted in lost tax revenues of  
USD1.52 billion during 2001-10, or an average of  USD152 
million a year. However, the illicit flows for the three most 
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Projections
2015/16
Projections
In 
USD 
millions*
[18], [32]
263 167 177 161 167
Donor 
contributions
[11]
274 271 207 244 243
Total 
required 
to provide 
EHP
502 518 535 553 571
Percent of total
VAT (import and domestic) 32.6
PAYE 24
Company (corporate income) tax 13.3
Excise duties 12
Import duty 9.6
Withholding tax 8.7
Tax refunds 2.7
Other taxes 2.4
Total 100%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total Average
357 112 210 159 494 458 453 1,013 751 684 4,691 469
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recent years for which data are available - 2008-10 - are 
much higher, amounting to an average of  USD 846 million 
annually. This has resulted in estimated loss of  tax revenues 
of  USD 275 million per year. These figures amount to a 
substantial proportion of  Malawi’s revenue. For the period 
1980-2009, Malawi lost an average of  around 12 per cent 
of  GDP in illicit financial flows25. Table 4 shows that illicit 
financial flows amount to an average of  18.1 per cent of  
GDP in the three years 2008-10.
Table 4: Illicit financial flows and lost tax revenues as percentage of 
GDP
It is unclear what proportion of  taxes is paid by companies in 
Malawi as the data in Table 2 do not disaggregate company and 
individual tax payments. The extractives sector is increasingly 
important with the expectation that mining companies will 
pay significant amounts in tax in the coming years. However, 
this is not yet the case. Although mining exports were worth 
USD 114 million in 2010, equivalent to 10 per cent of  all 
exports and USD 123 million in 2011[29], mining currently 
contributes little in taxes. Data on the country’s total revenues 
from mining are not regularly available. The only revenue 
figure provided by the Government is ‘slightly over 2 billion 
Malawian Kwacha (MK)’ in 2010, which amounted to 0.76 
per cent of  government tax revenues [29]. Projections are 
that, without remedial action by the government, Malawi will 
continue to lose significant potential tax revenues from illicit 
financial flows. Using International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
figures for projected GDP and assuming that tax revenue 
losses from illicit financial flows will remain at 5.9 per cent 
(the same as the average for 2008-10), Malawi will lose USD 
1.98 billion in the seven years 2011-17. This would be an 
average of  USD 283 million a year.
Tax incentives
In addition to losing tax revenues from illicit financial 
flows, many low-income countries are foregoing revenues 
from the tax incentives - provided mainly to companies, 
especially mining companies. Tax incentives can be defined 
as ‘a deduction, exclusion or exemption from a tax liability, 
offered as an enticement to engage in a specified activity such 
as investment in capital goods for a certain period’. These 
include different forms of  tax holidays and low tax rates.
Tax incentives in Malawi are enshrined in the main tax 
legislation such as the Customs and Excise Act, the Income 
Act and the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) Act. Malawi 
provides tax incentives to foreign investors to encourage 
greater amounts of  foreign direct investment. One recent 
estimate, following analysis of  selected companies’ financial 
reports, is that tax incentives have resulted in revenues 
foregone of  a minimum of  USD 588 million in the five years 
2008-12, meaning an average of  USD 117.6 million a year .
The health sector related opportunity costs of illicit 
flows and tax incentives
Principal findings
This analysis has demonstrated that the government of  
Malawi spends approximately USD 170 million on health 
for the population each year; donors contribute around 
USD 250 million. Together these do not reach the amount 
required to provide the minimal health package, which is 
estimated to require USD 530 million. Each year USD 275 
million of  government revenue is foregone in the form of  
potential taxes on flows of  capital from the country and 
an additional USD 117 million is foregone due to tax lost 
through tax incentives. If  these flows could be curtailed 
and tax incentives reduced, the country could pay for 
the minimal health package with domestically mobilized 
resources. This would have the advantage of  decreasing the 
dependence on unpredictable donor pledges and would help 
with health systems planning; for example, it is challenging 
to hire healthcare workers if  there is uncertainty about donor 
pledges. The decision on how to spend these additional, 
but still scarce, domestically mobilized resources should be 
made in a way which best meets the country’s needs. We 
have used health expenditure in order to show the scale of  
the opportunities lost but the impact on health may be even 
greater if  spent on other sectors such as infrastructure or 
education.
There is debate about the efficacy of  tax incentives in 
attracting investment and whether the loss of  tax outweighs 
the benefits from increased investment. There is a 
considerable literature suggesting that tax incentives are not 
needed to encourage investment and there is no evidence 
either in support of  tax incentives or against tax incentives 
in the context of  Malawi30. Tax incentives can be provided to 
support domestic companies, or deployed to help the poor, 
for example by reducing taxes on basic food items. However, 
the key issue is to differentiate between tax incentives that 
serve a strategic purpose which benefits broader society or 
the economy, and those that favor’s individual companies 
and provide little or no benefit to the economy. Bilateral 
agreements signed with individual companies are especially 
open to criticism.
Conclusions and recommendations
On the issue of  illicit financial flows, the government and 
international partners need to work on a variety of  fronts 
to secure action to clamp down on the use of  tax havens 
and to require much greater transparency and the automatic 
exchange of  information on the activities of  companies 
operating across borders. International developmental 
partners could play an important role, while continuing 
to support developmental efforts, which is treating the 
symptoms of  poverty, they could also advocate to reduce 
the causes31. The Malawian government could add its voice 
to those calls for all transnational companies to report their 
financial accounts on a country-by-country basis, in order 
2008 2009 2010 Average
Malawian 
GDP 
(USD million) 
[21][31]*
4,255 4,682 5,039 4,659
Illicit 
financial 
flows 
(USD million) 
[24]
1,103 751 684 846
Illicit 
financial 
flows as 
% of 
GDP
25.9 16.0 13.6 18.1
Estimated 
lost tax 
revenues 
(USD million)
359 244 222 275
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to scrutinize company financial flows and tax payments in 
each country in which they operate. One policy area directly 
under the government’s authority concerns transfer pricing. 
The government could strengthen its regulations to ensure 
that companies operating in Malawi are not able to reduce 
their taxable income by engaging in transfer pricing. It could 
increase the number and expertise of  staff  monitoring and 
scrutinizing company accounts and increase the penalties 
payable by companies if  they are found to be engaged in 
illicit activities. Policy on tax incentives is also under the 
control of  the government. The authorities could review the 
policy of  tax incentives with a view to reducing or abolishing 
those incentives provided for the purposes of  encouraging 
foreign direct investment. They could also promote much 
greater transparency on the issue, for example by publishing 
an annual figure on the extent of  government tax incentives, 
to allow for adequate parliamentary, public and media debate 
on the subject.
While these issues may seem far removed from healthcare 
workers, this analysis demonstrates the opportunity costs in 
terms of  the healthcare budget. We should individually and 
in our professional organizations advocate for legislation 
which will curtail illicit flows and tax preferences which do 
not benefit broader society.
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